


Department of the Army  
Pamphlet 525-15  
Air Force Pamphlet 400-19

Military Operations

## The Joint Force Development Process



Headquarters Departments of the  
Army and the Air Force  
15 June 1987

Department of the Army  
Headquarters, U.S. Army  
Washington, D.C.


Department of the Air Force  
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force  
Washington, D.C.

TO: The Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership of the US  
Army and the US Air Force

A theme that is continually reinforced in our discussions with the Congress, Defense leadership, and commanders is jointness. If we had to go to war today, it would be as part of the **joint and combined team**.

The Army - Air Force Joint Force Development Process is a success story implicit in the foregoing. The following document describes the process and the organization that has evolved and should be viewed as a case study in interservice cooperation. The process works; indeed, it has special momentum, because we have **made jointness our business**.

You as leaders need to portray to your constituents the intensity of the Services' commitment to coordinate doctrine, training, and equipment programs, capitalizing on the strengths of each Service to field the most capable and affordable **Total Force**.

  
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

  
LARRY D. WELCH  
General, United States Air Force  
Chief of Staff



## The Joint Force Development Process

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
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## An Historical Perspective

The Army—Air Force Joint Force Development Process (JFDP) is certainly not the only significant contemporary example of interservice cooperation. But, it is an important relevant historical example in successful top-down management of complex systems. As such, this Primer should be of value to all military professionals, educators, staff officers, and future military leaders concerned about the management of a complex, cooperative and changing joint warfighting system.


The Army—Air Force Joint Force Development Process is a long term, dynamic process. It evolved as part of a post-Vietnam watershed period in jointness, and its roots lie in a broad range of Army, Navy and Air Force initiatives.



A notable example is the 1982 U.S. Army—U.S. Navy agreement on strategic mobility which has been expanded three times through 1986.<sup>1</sup> It provides for significant mobility and sustainability enhancements such as the prepositioning of war materials, the Cargo Off-Load and Discharge System (COLDS), and Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS).

Also in 1982, far-reaching U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force cooperation in development of joint warfighting procedures, such as Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) and Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), led to an April 1983 Army—Air Force agreement to use Army AirLand Battle Doctrine as the basis for joint training and for joint tactics, techniques, and procedures developments.<sup>2</sup>


This close U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force cooperation in doctrine and procedures led directly in June 1983 to a seminal CSA/CSAF agreement in joint force development. The Service Chiefs announced a joint effort in developing a single package of programs for the joint attack of enemy follow-on forces.<sup>3</sup>



In October 1983, the two Service Chiefs expanded their efforts and directed a study be conducted and completed in time to impact the FY 86–90 Programmed Objective Memorandum (POM) that would provide “The most combat effective, affordable joint forces” necessary for joint combat operations.<sup>4</sup> In November 1983, a small study group was formed to conduct the study. Six Army and six Air Force study group members, selected for their collective knowledge and broad experience across the spectrum of combat functional areas, were assembled from the Service staffs, Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Army Materiel Command (AMC).

The Service Chiefs provided the focus for the study effort: “Squeeze the maximum capability from each dollar spent; develop complementary rather than duplicative capabilities.”

The Army and Air Force Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS)—the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (AF/XO), respectively—directed the study, provided specific guidance through a series of in-progress reviews



(IPRs), and expedited coordination and resolution of issues. Study group methodology was straightforward:


- Review Service doctrine.
- Develop a joint warfighting construction.
- Identify key warfighting capabilities.
- Review Service POM to determine duplicative programs and voids in key warfighting capabilities.

In March 1984 (5 months after the effort started), the Service Chiefs reviewed the preliminary study recommendations. A month later they approved the study group's final report. Their approval of this no-holds-barred report was viewed as a significant decision that affected Service programs and some longstanding Service roles and missions. Consequently, to ensure the smooth, expeditious implementation of the report and its initiatives the Service Chiefs directed that a formal announcement be preceded by extensive briefings to key leaders throughout the Defense establishment—key Congressional committee members, The Secretary of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commanders, and Service major commanders.

Originally, 31 warfighting initiatives (app A) for joint Army and Air Force action were announced in a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the two

Service Chiefs on 22 May 1984.<sup>5</sup> The Memorandum of Agreement identified these initiatives as only the first step of a long-term, dynamic process with broad goals . . . and clearly defined objectives.


## GOALS



ESTABLISH A LONG TERM  
DYNAMIC PROCESS TO...


- MAXIMIZE TOTAL FORCE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
- FIELD AFFORDABLE JOINT FORCES
- STRENGTHEN MUTUAL TRUST and CONFIDENCE

## OBJECTIVES




### EFFECTIVENESS

- FILL VOIDS
- REALIGN ROLES, MISSIONS
- FIELD COMPATIBLE SYSTEMS



### EFFICIENCY

- COMPLEMENT
- AVOID DUPLICATION
- SEEK COMMONALITY



### ECONOMY

- BUILD AFFORDABLE FORCES
- COST AVOIDANCE
- MAX CAPABILITY FOR INVESTMENT

Navy participation began almost immediately in selective initiatives of mutual interest. In July 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations accepted the invitation of the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff to become a full partner in the Joint Force Development Process.



The ad hoc task force assembled for the Service Chiefs' study was not designed to implement their decisions nor to manage this permanent joint process. Recognizing their JFDP required a management structure, the Service Chiefs identified three immediate management goals:

**Production**—implement the approved initiatives.

**Institutionalization**—integrate the process into normal Service staff functions.

**Growth**—continue the refinement of Service programs and force employment through warfighting analyses.

To fulfill these goals, a joint service office was formed—the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office (JAIO).



### Organizing for Success

#### Managing Complex Systems

The original study group, the Joint Force Development Working Group, was ideally organized for the short-term task of ferreting out potential program and doctrine enhancements. Group members were assembled for their across-the-board knowledge and experience. Each possessed specific expertise in selected warfighting functions such as intelligence; information management; doctrine, training and combat developments; tactical air operations; and maneuvers.

The group members were on directed duty to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (AF/XO), and worked completely under their direction and management. To facilitate their research, assessments, and open discussions the group members were permitted to conduct their efforts without the requirement to coordinate with or to adhere to the staff coordination policies of their parent organizations.

This type of organization is very effective for brainstorming new ideas. It can be established rapidly and is extremely flexible, both in its operation as well as in its possible modification to meet changing requirements and direction.

Also, it is equally applicable at the Service level or the unit organizational level. Field commands as well as logistical bases, tactical units, and administrative agencies can employ a group like the Joint Force Development Working Group to address its joint concerns and key issues.

Although the Joint Force Development Working Group is effective for efforts with specific broad goals and clearly defined objectives, it is not an efficient management technique for long-term or complex projects (such as: implementation of the across-the-board warfighting initiatives, with requirements for doctrinal or programmatic follow-through; projects that span the full range of Service warfighting functions; or projects that have four-Service impact).


The solution to managing this type of project was the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office (JAIO) which is discussed later.

## Expansion

As if the task of expeditiously implementing the initiatives was not overwhelming in and of itself, the scope of the JFDP expanded rapidly.

## Staff Officer Exchange Program

In June 1984, the Army and Air Force Operations Deputies established a Staff Officer Exchange Program. It was designed to foster mutual trust and confidence through the sharing of ideas and to develop a nucleus of officers with interservice experience and perspective.<sup>6</sup> The Navy became a full participant in the exchange program in February 1986.<sup>7</sup>




Service Staff Exchange Officers serve for 1 year as full-fledged members of their host staff. To ensure that exchange officers could be identified and tracked for future key joint assignments, procedures were developed to capture this unique joint experience within the Services' personnel management systems.

Finally, because of the immediate and continuing successes of the Staff Officer Exchange Program, the Service Chiefs directed its expansion throughout the Services' staffs and established as a goal a level of participation within every Service staff functional area.

## Teaching

An education program was initiated as an important pillar of the Joint Force Development Process. The Service Chiefs and the OPSDEPS used every opportunity to explain the purposes and results of the JFDP to members of Congress, Department of Defense, and to audiences within their Services.




## TEACHING THE PROCESS

- LED BY CHIEFS
- EXPANSION THROUGHOUT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
- BROAD MEDIA INTEREST

The Service Chiefs' commitment to JFDP engendered a great deal of interest from the media, and since the Service Chiefs' historic May 1984 Memorandum of Agreement, more than 34 articles have been published about JFDP. This focused attention led to a greatly expanded shared base of knowledge about JFDP's goals, objectives, initiatives, corollary actions, and management principles.

The immediate acceptance of and active participation in JFDP by the Services' senior warfighters were positive indicators of its value. The Service Chiefs recognized that this long term dynamic process needed a continuum of new ideas on which to flourish and grow; and the best insurance to ensure that the process would indeed continue to provide direct support to the warfighters was to embed it as a permanent part of the Services' professional military educational system.




In order to develop an early and sustained awareness and appreciation of the need for jointness throughout the officer corps, the Service Chiefs directed

that the JFDP become a formal part of the curricula of mid-level and senior service schools. Common themes were developed for each level of education.<sup>8</sup>

### JFDP Roundtable

As the process expanded, the OPSDEPS tasked the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office (JAIO) to serve as a link between the JFDP and other worldwide efforts that address joint warfighting issues and capabilities. The result was the JFDP Roundtable.<sup>9</sup>



The JFDP Roundtable is product oriented; meets quarterly to discuss and coordinate warfighting issues, current projects, emerging joint needs and potential candidate initiatives; and is hosted by the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, representing the JFDP. Other regular members include the following:

- Airland Forces Application Agency (ALFA) (TAC/TRADOC)
- Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency (ACRA) (MAC/TRADOC)
- Directorate for AirLand Forces Application (DALFA) (USAFE/USAREUR)
- Joint Air Naval Applications Directorate (JANAD) (USAFE/USNAVEUR)
- Joint Interoperability (JIO) (J7, OJCS)
- Joint and Combined Operations Division (ATDO-J) (TRADOC)
- Doctrine Division (XPJ) (TAC)

Informal Marine Corps and Joint Staff participation have been invaluable to this free exchange of ideas.

## **Coordination**

The broad scope of the initiatives and the overall Joint Force Development Process itself spanned virtually every functional organization on the Service staffs and impacted nearly every warfighting command. Therefore, the Service Chiefs retained ultimate decision authority but delegated Executive Agent authority to their Operations Deputies.

Also, the Service Chiefs established as a minimum a desktide briefing on the status of the process and the initiatives once every quarter.

In order to expedite the resolution of issues and the implementation of the initiatives, the Service Chiefs permitted the JFDP to operate directly under the OPSDEPS without the strict adherence to the formal staffing procedures. However, coordination with the Service agencies and major commands was a necessary rule. The success of the JFDP would depend on the support of both the Services staffs and the major commands.

A successful management system began to evolve. The scope of the initiatives dictated that direct responsibility for implementation could not be retained by any one Service, office or a task force. A shared responsibility had to be fixed within the normal staff organization of the Services and major commands. The lion's share of that responsibility fell naturally to the operations directorates.

The OPSDEPS, with their dual roles as Service deputy chiefs of staff and JCS Operations Deputies, could coordinate JFDP actions horizontally among other functional Service deputy chiefs of staff, sister Services, unified and specified commands, and within OJCS; and vertically among Service staff directorates and Service major commands.

The OPSDEPS agreed that the significance of JFDP and the importance of the warfighting initiatives demanded their active involvement in monthly working sessions.

## **Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office (JAIO)**


The Service Chiefs required a day-to-day manager and facilitator for their JFDP. They established a unique multiservice office, the JAIO, with broad authority to coordinate horizontally, vertically and diagonally as required to manage, expand, and institutionalize the process.<sup>10</sup>

Each participating Service provided to JAIO a Co-Chairpersons and several action officers with broad operational and Service staff experience. The JAIO was authorized direct access to the Operations Deputies in order to manage the

process. Additionally, monthly working sessions were conducted to review the status of selected initiatives and projects.


The JAIO monitored and facilitated the implementation of approved initiatives. Just as important, the JAIO became the Service Chiefs' think tank, coordinating the development of potential new warfighting initiatives. They prepared, coordinated and presented decision information to the Service leadership, the Service major commanders, and to unified and specified commanders. As JAIO provided overall management to the Staff Officer Exchange Program, the JFDP Roundtable, and other ancillary activities.

A stylization of JAIO is shown below.




## Worldwide Communication

The JAIO-developed, sponsored and administered a computer-based teleconferencing network—JFDPNET, to facilitate the resolution of the Service Chiefs' initiatives and provide a sounding board for new JFDP ideas. The JFDPNET allows worldwide access to the JFDP 24 hours a day, by more than 50 designated agencies who are involved in JFDP. The JFDPNET permits timely unclassified participation in the process without the TDY and travel costs. The JFDPNET is also used to coordinate initiative tasks, milestones, and reports.



In summary, the Service Chiefs are the beginning and end points for the Joint Force Development Process and all JFDP products. Their Operations Deputies are the Executive Agents who not only focus the process and the initiatives but also work hand-in-glove with the Service staffs and the staffs of unified and major commands to implement the Service Chiefs' decisions. The JAIO is a facilitator in the process, acting as the catalyst to keeping things moving, on track, and on time.

## JFDP...



- **STARTS WITH SERVICE CHIEFS**
- **OPSDEPs EXECUTIVE AGENTS**
- **CLOSE COORDINATION**
- **OBJECTIVE: ENHANCED WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES**

### The Search for New Ideas

#### Innovation and Consensus-Building

Three events drove the search for follow-on initiatives.

First was the requirement for continuity within the process. Within 18 months of the May 1984 agreement establishing the JFDP, a number of the original 31 initiatives were implemented. That is, if not completely finished and closed, they at least had an action plan with definitive milestones in place. Implemented initiatives took on a specified, timed life of their own. The focused attention of the Service Chiefs was no longer required to ensure follow-through.

Second was a heightened Navy desire to participate in the JFDP as a full participant in the JFDP. Of the original 31 Army-Air Force initiatives, only five were broad enough to warrant meaningful Navy play. The scope of the initiatives needed to be expanded, therefore, in order to accommodate increased Navy participation.

The third was the Service Chiefs' desire to follow through more precisely and visibly in focusing the JFDP in direct support to the warfighting CINCs.

The result was that the commanders of the unified, specified, and major commands, as well as the Services staffs, were invited to nominate candidate initiatives in accordance with three criteria:

- The issue must be of concern to the unified commanders.
- It must have worldwide applicability.
- It must require the focused attention of the Service Chiefs to resolve or to ensure programmatic support.

As a result of the Service Chiefs' message, nine candidate initiatives were forwarded to JAIO within the following 3 months. Several months later visits by JAIO to all the Unified CINCs and major commanders resulted in their heightened interest, and by the end of 1986 a total of 46 candidate initiatives (app. B) had been submitted from the Unified and Specified Commands, the Services major commands, and the Services staffs.

These 46 candidate initiatives addressed a wide spectrum of warfighting areas and functions as identified below:


| Function            | Number of Candidates |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| COMMAND AND CONTROL | 10                   |
| INTELLIGENCE        | 8                    |
| TRAINING            | 7                    |
| COMMUNICATIONS      | 6                    |
| LOGISTICS           | 4                    |
| ELECTRONIC WARFARE  | 4                    |
| MUNITIONS           | 4                    |
| DOCTRINE            | 2                    |
| ACQUISITION         | 1                    |

Seven candidate initiatives were approved by the OPSDEPS and accepted by the Service Chiefs and became (with the merging of two candidates) Chiefs Initiatives 32 through 37. Equally important, 35 other candidate initiatives were successfully resolved outside of the JFDP by referral to the appropriate agencies for action. The remaining four candidates continue in the analysis process.

### Assessment of Candidate Initiatives

The OPSDEPS directed that a rigorous methodology be developed for assessing the candidate initiatives. It was important that every candidate initiative was thoroughly researched and evaluated to insure that the Service Chiefs' criteria were met, as well as to preclude an overextension of the Service Chiefs' top-down management.

### INPUT . . . CANDIDATE INITIATIVES



Consequently, the OPSDEPS shepherded the phases of the assessment methodology to provide the Service Chiefs with only those candidate initiatives that met the mark.

## Methodology

JAIO, in coordination with the Service staffs, major commands and the nominating agency, is responsible for conducting a rapid, detailed front-end assessment to clarify the issue, to ensure that it meets the established criteria for JFDP initiatives, and to determine whether the intent of the proposal is not already being accomplished in another forum.


This thorough assessment is presented to the OPSDEPS for early guidance. Those proposals meriting further assessment are then refined and formally coordinated with the appropriate field commands and service staff agencies.

A final OPSDEPS review determines whether the proposal is forwarded to the Service Chiefs for approval or resolved outside of the JFDP. From submission to decision, a candidate initiative is acted upon by the OPSDEPS usually within four months.

## Resolution—Examples

A number of candidate initiatives have been referred to the Joint Staff for appropriate resolution among the four Services.<sup>11</sup> An example is the issue of the command relationship of organic Army Corps HAWK battalions to the area air defense command. It potentially affected both the authority of the Area Air Defense Commander as outlined in JCS Pub 8 as well as the integrity of the area air defense system. The issue was successfully resolved under the JCS Joint Doctrine Pilot Program and captured in JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counter Air Operations.

### COMMAND RELATIONSHIP... CORPS HAWK to AADC




- GENERATED BY ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE
- REVIEWED ARMY and JOINT DOCTRINE TO ENSURE UNITY OF AIR & GROUND COUNTERAIR EFFORTS
- COORDINATED AS ADJUNCT TO JCS JOINT DOCTRINE PILOT PROGRAM

### Resolution... JCS PUB 26... JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THEATER AIR OPERATIONS

- CORPS... OPERATIONAL COMMAND
- AADC... ENGAGEMENT CONTROL

Similarly, other candidate initiatives have been referred to the Services' major commands for resolution. For instance, the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Modular Control Element (MCE) is habitually transported and positioned by medium lift helicopters. Headquarters, Tactical Air Command (TAC) proposed that procedures be developed allowing the Air Force to submit requests for Army general support aviation assets. Under JFDP Initiative #30, Intratheater Airlift, the Army and Air Force had already created an agency ideally suited to resolve this issue—the TRADOC/MAC Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency (ACRA). As a result of a JFDP Roundtable meeting, ACRA accepted the lead in developing request procedures which have since been incorporated into AFM 2-50/FM 100-27, USA/USAF Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations; and FM 55-40, Air Transport Operations.



*Resolution... PROCEDURES INCORPORATED...*  
 DRAFT AFM 2-50/FM 100-27 "USA/USAF DOCTRINE  
 FOR TACTICAL AIRLIFT OPERATIONS"


A number of candidate initiatives survived the rigorous methodology and have been approved as Chiefs Initiatives. When a candidate initiative is approved for action by the Service Chiefs, staff proponents and action agencies are designated and the new initiative is managed as described in chapter 2.

Significantly, every nominated candidate initiative is worked to successful resolution, either by approval as a Chiefs Initiative or by assignment as a Service staff or major command action. JAIO plays a key role for the Service Chiefs by monitoring the resolution of initiatives or actions that are being worked by the Service staffs or major commands.

## JFDP Relook

In accordance with the CSA/CSAF Memorandum of Agreement that established the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, a two-part methodology for periodic review of Service programs was developed by JAIO. The review, oriented at the operational and strategic levels of war, focuses on high-payoff issues that impact the Services equipment programs, force structure, doctrine, and procedures.<sup>12</sup>

### JFDP PHASE III... RELOOK '87



In Part 1 of the Relook the task force examines warfighting planning guidance, joint doctrine, and Service doctrine and strategies to determine key warfighting capabilities shared by more than one Service.

A JAIO-led task force of Service subject matter experts operates directly under the OPSDEPS who provide critical and timely guidance and judgement throughout the entire Relook effort.

In Part 2, proposals are developed for sharing technologies, eliminating duplication or filling voids in Service programs and doctrine. These proposals are then subjected to the rigorous review process described above for candidate initiatives.


The combination of inputs from the CINCs and major commanders and JAIO in-house studies has maintained a high level of continuity and vitality in the JFDP.



## Institutionalization

### Input-Output Flow

The following diagram depicts the key elements of a successful initiative. The upper circle contains some of the elements that make up initiatives. From this diagram and previous descriptions of the analysis process that generates joint initiatives for action, it should be apparent that the JFDP, and its initiatives in particular, are a complement to the Services' normal Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). The initiatives are supported by sound programmatic follow through on the one hand and by concept validation and refinement through field and command exercises on the other.



### Programmatic Follow-Through—Initiative #31

The Initiative #31: POM Priority Lists was designed specifically to ensure coherent programmatic follow-through on JFDP initiatives and other programs of joint interest. All four Service programmers have agreed to exchange information on programs of mutual interest.<sup>13</sup> This exchange occurs frequently throughout the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle and includes a series of briefings on key programs. Procedures are in place for the timely dissemination of program adjustments to all affected sister Services. Just as important, parallel Army-Air Force procedures have been developed to coordinate the special access programs.

## **INITIATIVE #31: POM PRIORITY LISTS**

### **INITIATIVE:**

**FORMALIZE CROSS-SERVICE PARTICIPATION**

### **TASKING:**

**DEVELOP THE STRUCTURE**

### **ACTIONS:**

**ARMY/AIR FORCE/NAVY/MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMERS'**

**MOA SIGNED (3 DEC 84)**

**IMPLEMENTED (DEC 84)**

**MOA ON SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS (MAR 86)**

The Service Chiefs JFDP Initiative #31 has resulted in a significant harmonization of the Services' programs.

## **Doctrinal Follow-Through—Initiative #34**

Similar to the programmatic follow-through of Initiative #31, a parallel Memorandum of Agreement with U.S. Readiness Command "closes the loop" on the development of Army-Air Force warfighting operational tactics, techniques and procedures.<sup>14</sup> To ensure that JFDP's warfighting operational concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures work when fielded, USREDCOM evaluates and validates those JFDP products during worldwide joint readiness exercises.

## **INITIATIVE #43: VALIDATION OF JFDP PROCEDURES**

### **INITIATIVE:**

**EVALUATE AND REFINE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES**

### **TASKING:**

**DEVELOP AN MOA ON USREDCOM'S ROLE**


**"CLOSE THE LOOP"**

With the disestablishment of USREDCOM, the responsibility for joint tactics, techniques and procedures has been transferred to OJCS J-7 as a field activity. The result is that the Initiative #34 Memorandum of Agreement to evaluate and refine JFDP tactics, techniques and procedures continues in force.

## **Streamlined Management**

The successes of these two initiatives, as well as others, has allowed the Service Chiefs and their Operations Deputies to streamline the management procedures in order to focus on critical on-going initiatives and candidate initiatives.

# Streamlining JEDP MANAGEMENT



- MAINTAINS SHARPNESS OF CHIEFS' FOCUS
- ENSURES ACCOUNTABILITY

Unique criteria are established for every initiative categorizing them as “Closed” or “Implemented.”

“Implemented” initiatives are those for which an action plan and management structure are in place to satisfy the Service Chiefs’ intent. These initiatives might require months or longer to bring to final successful resolution, but they have a life of their own; the Service Chiefs’ personal attention is no longer required.

“Closed initiatives” are just that—closed. No further action is required to satisfy the Service Chiefs’ intent.

JAIO, instead of shepherding all initiatives to closure, transfers oversight responsibility to a staff coordinating agency coincident with implementation. The staff coordinating agency is the designated lead Service staff proponent for the initiative.

The staff coordinating agency is directly responsible for ensuring completion of all tasks directly associated with the initiative and for coordinating both programmatic and doctrinal follow-through to closure. Quarterly reports to the OPSDEPS allow for top-level review, refinement of guidance or procedures, and resolution of significant issues.



### The Future

#### The Army-Air Force Joint Force Development Process


The JFDP in its present form will continue to serve the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the foreseeable future.

In the first place, the JFDP is a tried and proven producer. In the resolution of the original 31 initiatives alone, the process has achieved well over a billion dollars in cost avoidances, has produced nearly a dozen joint warfighting concepts, and has resulted in two dozen interservice agreements for cooperative force development. The bottom line is that the JFDP is helping us fight better. The combination of the Service Chiefs' initiatives, the Staff Officer Exchange Program, and the JFDP Roundtable has resulted in a giant leap forward in nurturing mutual trust and confidence among the participating Services and in fostering a total force approach to force development.

Second, there is plenty of work yet to be done. A handful of the most difficult initiatives are still being shepherded toward resolution. Even the implemented and closed initiatives must be revisited periodically to resolve unforeseen issues; to ensure continued programmatic support and follow-through; and to test, validate or refine, and codify joint tactics, techniques and procedures.

Finally, the JFDP continues to grow. Suggestions from the warfighting commanders and periodic in-house "JFDP Relook" analyses, as described in chapter 3, have been fruitful in identifying new opportunities to share technologies, to avoid unnecessary duplication, and to fill voids in the Services' capabilities. At the same time, the process has been reoriented by the OPSDEPS toward the operational and strategic levels of warfare thus providing more opportunities for the development of cooperative joint capabilities. And as a result of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the development of a nucleus of officers with interservice perspectives and experience has attained even greater significance. Consequently, efforts continue towards expanding the participation in the Staff Officers Exchange Program across all Service staff functional areas.

## **BOTTOM LINE...**



- 80% OF INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED
- OVER \$1 BIL. IN COST AVOIDANCE
- BROAD SUPPORT OF WARFIGHTING CINCS
- ACROSS THE BOARD WARFIGHTING ENHANCEMENTS

In summary, the JFDP continues to serve the Service Chiefs well and has become a significant factor in enhancing joint Army-Air Force warfighting capabilities.

### **The Process**

The generic management process described in chapter 2 is a proven case study in successful joint force development that can be characterized principally by top-down management of a handful of the Services most challenging issues. That process could be applied by the Services major commands, the warfighting CINCs, or the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) to produce similar results.

But, the imperatives of the JFDP would have to be retained; otherwise, the process would wither within the management procedures of any bureaucracy.

An organization like JAIO provides a team effort to surface innovative ideas; act as a forum for independent, operationally oriented warfighting analyses applied to specific force employment and programmatic issues; or be a model for positive, interactive working relationships among the Services staffs, major commands, the Joint Staff, and unified/specified command staffs.

A JAIO-like office can be established within any command, but ideally it would have to retain direct access to both the "executive agents" for frequent guidance and direction and to the joint senior leaders for decisions through periodic in-progress reviews.

The JFDP has proven to be a bold and compelling idea that has achieved remarkable results through top-down management. It is a proven winner that can focus top management within any organization on the resolution of its most demanding issues.



## **Appendix A**

### **Chiefs/Warfighting Initiatives**

#### **Subject Title**

1. Area SAMs/Fighters
2. Point Air Defense
3. Counter Heliborne Assault Threat
4. Tactical Missile Threat
5. Identification of Friend or Foe Systems (IFF)
6. Rear Area Operations Centers
7. Host Nation Support
8. Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD)
9. ABGD Training
10. Rear Area Close Air Support
11. Mobile Weapon System
12. Ground Based Electronic Combat (EC)
13. Airborne Radar Jamming Systems (ARJS)
14. Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)
15. Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD)
16. Combat Search and Rescue (SAR)
17. Rotary Wing SOF
18. Joint Tactical Missile Systems
19. Munitions RDT&E
20. Night Combat
21. Battlefield Air Interdiction
22. Joint Target Set
23. Theater Interdiction Systems
24. Close Air Support
25. ALO/FAC/TACP
26. Manned Aircraft Systems
27. Joint STARS
28. TR-1
29. Manned Tactical Recce
30. Intratheater Airlift
31. POM Priority Lists
32. Rapid Targeting Capability
33. Future Close Air Support
34. JFDP Validation
35. Center for Low Intensity Conflict
36. Joint Warfare Center
37. Flag Officer Warfighting Course



## Appendix B Candidate Initiatives

| Subject Title  | Originator             |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Rapid Targeting Capability                          | CINCUSAREUR/CINCUSAFE  |
| 2. SAC Support to Rapid Targeting                      | CINCSAC                |
| 3. Future Close Air Support                            | CSA/CSAF               |
| 4. Validation of JFDP Procedures                       | CINCRED                |
| 5. Center for Low Intensity Conflict                   | CSAF                   |
| 6. Joint Warfare Center                                | CINCRED                |
| 7. Flag Officer Warfighting Course                     | CSA/CSAF               |
| 8. Special Intelligence Systems—Air Defense            | CINCEUR                |
| 9. Operational Electronic Intelligence                 | CINCEUR                |
| 10. Joint Planning and Execution of Electronic Jamming | CINCEUR/CINCLANTFLT    |
| 11. Secure Enroute Communications Package              | CINCRED/FORSCOM        |
| 12. Joint Repair of Common Use Equipment               | AFLC/CC                |
| 13. Joint Aircraft Battle Damage Repair                | AFLC/CC                |
| 14. Joint Helicopter Airlift Support                   | CINCRED                |
| 15. Joint C <sup>2</sup> Center Standardization        | CINCRED                |
| 16. Joint Tactical Air Operations                      | CINCRED                |
| 17. Standardized Target Aimpoint Data Base             | CINCPAC                |
| 18. Joint Theater Secure Voice Communications          | CINCPAC/CINCPACAF      |
| 19. Follow-On Anti-Ship Missile                        | CINCPAC/CINCPACAF      |
| 20. Human Factors                                      | AU/CC                  |
| 21. AOE HAWK Battalion                                 | CINCRED                |
| 22. Joint Readiness Training Facility                  | CSA                    |
| 23. JTF Communications                                 | CINCRED                |
| 24. Airspace Command and Control                       | TRADOC                 |
| 25. ECM/ECCM   | TRADOC                 |
| 26. Battle Simulation                                  | TRADOC                 |
| 27. Communications/COMSEC Capability                   | TRADOC                 |
| 28. Counter Air  | TRADOC                 |
| 29. Airland Battle Manual                              | TRADOC                 |
| 30. Air Munitions Interoperability                     | CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT |
| 31. ASWOC Contingency Use for Joint C <sup>2</sup>     | CINCPACFLT             |

| Subject Title                                      | Originator       |
|--|------------------|
| 32. KC-10/KC-135 Hose Reel Pod Modification        | CINCPACFLT       |
| 33. OTH Detection and Targeting                    | CINCPACFLT       |
| 34. Joint Air Insertion Vehicle Acquisition        | CINCPACFLT       |
| 35. TLAM/C and USAF TACAIR                         | CINCPACFLT       |
| 36. SOF Communications                             | CINCLANTFLT      |
| 37. Tactical Communication and Deception           | CINCLANTFLT      |
| 38. RPV Employment                                 | CINCLANTFLT      |
| 39. Joint Tactical C <sup>3</sup> Interoperability | CINCEUR          |
| 40. Joint Development of Intratheater Airlift      | CINCMAC/TRADOC   |
| 41. Comprehensive Space Operations Training        | CINCSpace/TRADOC |
| 42. Battlefield Surveillance Unmanned Vehicle      | CSAF             |
| 43. Target Acquisition                             | AU/CC            |
| 44. Mine Warfare                                   | AU/CC            |
| 45. Artillery Chaff                                | CSAF             |
| 46. Anti-Satellite Operations                      | Service Staffs   |

## **Appendix C Endnotes**

### **Chapter 1. An Historical Perspective**

1. Memorandum of Agreement USA/USN Strategic Mobility, ODCSLOG/OP-04, 1982.
2. Memorandum of Understanding on Joint USA/USSF Efforts for Enhancement of Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine, General E. C. Meyer, CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 21 April 1985.
3. Memorandum of Agreement, USA/USAF Joint Program Assessment, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 30 June 1983.
4. Memorandum of Understanding, Army/Air Force Initiation of a Joint U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force Development Process, 2 November 1983.
5. Memorandum of Agreement on U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 22 May 1984.

### **Chapter 2. Organizing for Success**

6. Memorandum of Understanding, Army/Air Force Exchange of Staff Officers, LTC Fred K. Mahaffey, DCSOPS, USA, and LTG John T. Chain, AF/XO, USAF, 1 June 1984.
7. Memorandum of Understanding Among Army, Navy, and Air Force Operations Deputies on Exchange of Staff Officers, 21 March 1986.
8. Letter, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA; General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF; and Admiral James D. Watkins, CNO, to Commander, TRADOC; Commandant, Army War College, Subject: Joint Force Development Process (JFDP) Education, 24 April 1986.
9. Message, Joint Force Development Process Roundtable, Colonel David E. K. Cooper, USA, Co-Chairman; and Colonel G. J. Prater, Jr., USAF, Co-Chairman, 23 August 1985.
10. Action Memorandum on Formation of U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 14 June 1984.

### **Chapter 3. The Search for New Ideas**

11. See Slide, Candidate Initiatives Status, on file in Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office.
12. Action Memorandum on Formation of U.S. Army—U.S. Air Force Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 14 June 1984.

## **Chapter 4. Institutionalization**

13. Memorandum of Agreement, Army/Air Force Cross-Service Participation in the POM Development Process, General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 29 November 1984. Follow-on memo signed by the four Services' Directors of Programs on 3 December 1984.
14. Memorandum of Agreement on USREDCOM's Role in the Joint Force Development Process (JFDP), General John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, and General Charles A. Gabriel, CSAF, 25 June 1985.

The proponent agencies of this pamphlet are the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Department of the Army, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (AF/XO), Department of the Air Force. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) direct to HQDA/HQ USAF (DAMO-ZJ/XOC), WASH DC, 20310-0460.

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